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Abstract 
The paper addresses two points: First, what is the effect of changes to the electoral  
system in Belgium and second, how do voters respond to the new electoral rules? If  
seat-maximization is the key link then this would lead to the prediction that parties  
that supported the change of the electoral system particularly the parties of the  
incumbent governing coalition (before the change took place for the 2003 election),  
should expect to fare better under the new rules than the old rules that translate votes  
into seats. The mechanical effects of the new electoral rules for 2003 when applied to  
the number of votes cast in 1995 and 1999 do have a small effect in the direction  
predicted by the theory. The governing parties together, particular the francophone ones,  
can expect to fare better under the new rules than under the old rules. Regarding the  
second question, the number of Strategic Voters in a given district is typically  
predicted by the district magnitude, i.e. the number of seats that are awarded at the  
primary electoral district level. Contrary to previous studies there is strong evidence  
of strategic voting particularly within the small Belgian districts. This analysis  
further demonstrates that even the new incentives to cast a strategic vote through the  
need for every party to overcome 5% of the district vote share before gaining  
representation has already a systematic impact on the decision-making process of Belgium  
voters. 
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 Traditionally, electoral systems are treated as exogenous factors determining the nature of the 
party systems or constraining an individual’s decision-making process. Thus, we do not know 
too much about the incentives to change existing electoral rules, particular in established 
democracies. From an outside perspective to such a rare process one can assume that parties 
have reasons to support electoral reform and how they form expectations about their likely 
consequences. Based on these assumptions one can derive predictable implications (King et 
al., 1994) of these unobservable and not reliably measurable processes or phenomenon in 
order to provide evidence for the assumed theory about party goals and the processes of the 
expectation formation process of party elites. Besides behaviour of party elites in the end 
what counts are voters’ reactions to the proposed changes. Do these changes provoke 
predictable behaviour on side of the voters? Using original survey data from a pre-electoral 
study of the parliamentary elections in Belgium one can show how voters respond to electoral 
reform. 
One theory recently proposed by Benoit (2004) offers a seat-maximizing logic for 
electoral system change. Starting with the premise of parties as basic actors in an collective 
choice process that will lead into an electoral system, expected seat-maximization is the 
hypothetical process that links institutional alternatives to actors’ electoral self-interest. Thus 
actors have to form expectations about the number of seats they might gain under different 
proposed electoral rules. How do actors form such expectations? One way or the other they 
have to entertain counterfactual experiments. What would the outcome of the election look 
like under different electoral rules? If seat-maximization is the key mechanism that links 
alternative proposals and the parties’ self-interest we would expect that the parties that 
supported the change of the electoral system should expect to fare better under the new rules 
than the old rules that translate votes into seats.  
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Belgium changed its electoral rules just before the 2003 parliamentary election 
(Hooghe 2003, Hooghe et al, 2003) without prior experimentation with new laws on the 
regional level for instance (???). Contrary to the old system before 2003 two small changes 
stand out. First, the electoral districts where aggregated to fewer but larger districts. Second, a 
five percent threshold on the new electoral district level was imposed in order to qualify for 
the seat distribution process. While the first change, larger district magnitude, typically fosters 
proportionality, the second change, a district threshold, has the potential to limit 
proportionality of the electoral system because it hinders the opportunity for small parties to 
win representation.  
Given that the old system and the two components of the new electoral system are the 
only clearly identifiable proposals out of the universe of electoral rules that could have been 
considered (Hooghe et al 2003, Hooghe et al forthcoming) I analyze in the following the 
effect of these two changes to the electoral system and compare it to the last election results 
under the old electoral system (in 1999). In contrast to Hooghe et al. (2003, forthcoming) I 
will not use the 2003 election results to asses the mechanical effects of this electoral reform. 
In order to test whether the seat-maximization logic is the driving force of electoral system 
change (Benoit 2004), at least for the parties in government who supported the change of the 
rules, we need to focus on how party elites formed their expectations about the potential 
mechanical effects of this reform before the change took place. Thus, the only information 
that was available are election results previous to the 2003 election. If seat-maximization is 
the key link then this would lead to the prediction that parties that supported the change of the 
electoral system particularly the parties of the incumbent governing coalition (before the 
change took place for the 2003 election), should expect to fare better under the new rules than 
the old rules that translate votes into seats. Thus compared to the actual result in 1999, the 
parties of the governing coalition - the Liberals, Socialist and the Greens - should gain more 
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seats under the new rules that are applied to the 2003 election than under the old rules. This 
would provide evidence for the seat-maximizing logic proposed by Benoit (2004). 
 
Table 1:  Simulations Based on 1999 Election Results 
 
 Official Result 
1999 
Larger districts Larger districts 
and threshold 
  Simulation 1 Simulation 2 
Agalev (Greens) 9 9 8 
SP (Socialists) 14 14 13 
VLD (Liberals) 23 23 23 
Vlaams Blok (extreme right) 15 15 15 
CD&V (Chr.-Dem.) 22 22 23 
VU-ID (nationalists) 8 7 6 
Ecolo (Greens) 11 12 12 
PS (Socialists) 19 19 20 
MR (Liberals) 18 18 19 
FN (extreme right) 1 1 1 
PSC (Chr.-Dem.) 10 10 10 
Total (Seats) 150 150 150 
 
Compared to the official result of the parliamentary election in 1999 the sole effect of 
combining small districts into larger districts does favour Ecolo. The French-speaking Green 
party would have gained one more seat, namely in Brussels, if the existing two-tier system 
would have been abandoned and seats were only distributed on the district-level. Conversely, 
the net effect of this change of the electoral system does harm the Flemish nationalist party, 
the Volksunie, predecessor of the N-VA. This party would loose one seat. The governing 
coalition would increase its combined seat shares from 94 to 95 seats. Although the effects of 
combining small districts into larger ones are not particularly large, the change does occur in 
the expected direction in favour of the governing parties. 
Beyond these net effects, the composition of parliament would also change. 
Interestingly, Ecolo’s additional fourth seat in Brussels comes at the cost of CD&V’s loss of 
its third seat there. Thus, interestingly, one seat originally held by a Flemish MP gets 
transferred to a seat held by a Walloon MP. While this particular MP of the CD&V in 
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Brussels would loose the seat, the Flemish Christian Democrats could compensate it on the 
national level because the party wins an additional second seat in Flemish Brabant instead, 
while the Flemish nationalists, the N-VA, would loose its only seat there. Thus the first 
simulation demonstrates that reducing the number of electoral districts from 20 smaller to 11 
larger districts does indeed bolster the (slim) majority of the governing coalition as expected 
by the seat-maximizing logic.  
In the second simulation, all seats are distributed according to the new electoral law of 
2003. Compared to the results of the first simulation we can asses the additional impact of a 
five percent threshold at the electoral district level on party seat shares and the composition of 
parliament. A party will never win seats with only 5% of the votes in smaller districts 
(threshold of exclusion, Leiphart1994), i.e. in districts with district magnitude smaller than 
10, even without the new threshold. In districts with a district magnitude of 19 and higher the 
effects of the district threshold definitely kicks in since 5% would be enough for any party to 
yield at least a seat (threshold of representation, Leiphart1994: 25-30). The effect implies, for 
instance, that the first seat for a small party in East-Flanders, Brussels or Antwerp is generally 
more expensive – it will cost 5% while for all other parties the cost of an additional seat will 
be “cheaper” than that.1 Looking closely at the district level, all additional changes induced 
by the threshold occur only in Brussels.2 Of course, the mechanical effect of such a thresho
should help large parties at the cost of locally small parties. This is exactly what happens. 
Three parties would loose representation in the district of Brussels - two parties from the 
governmental coalition (SP and Agalev) and one from the Opposition (N-VA), while also 
ld 
                                                 
1 In 2003 the first looser of the last seat in Brussels or Antwerp got more votes than the winner of the last seat 
“paid” for. 
2 A closer examination of the special provisions that were written in the electoral law as a consequence of the 
Belgium Supreme Court (Arbitration Court) ruling (Hooghe et al 2003, 2005) do not have an additional effect in 
1999. I in 2003 the number of „wasted“ votes cast for Ecolo in Walloon Brabant and subsequently added to the 
number of Ecolo votes in Brussels made a difference. The consequence is that Ecolo does in fact win a second 
seat in Brussels, a seat the Vlaams Block would otherwise have gotten. Again this does bolster the Walloon 
parties and parties of the former government. 
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three large parties in Brussels would gain one additional seat – PS and MR from the 
governmental coalition as well as CD&V from the Opposition. Although the absolute change 
is considerable, six parties either win an additional seat or even loose their only seat in this 
district, the distribution of power between the governing coalition and the opposition is left 
unchanged. The introduction of a district level threshold does not have an independent effect 
on the balance of power between government and opposition in parliament. All changes occur 
solely within these two blocs, generally favouring Walloon parties. The party that gets 
disadvantaged most is VU-ID, that would loose two seats, i.e., 25% of their seats in 
parliament, if the votes cast in 1999 are transformed into seats using the new rules of 2003.  
 
Table 2:  Simulations Based on 1995 Election Results 
 
 Official Result 
1995 
Larger districts Larger districts  
and threshold 
    Simulation 1 Simulation 2 
Agalev (Greens) 5 4 4 
SP (Socialists) 20 20 21 
VLD (Liberals) 21 21 21 
Vlaams Blok (extreme right) 11 11 11 
CD&V (Chr.-Dem.) 29 29 29 
VU-ID (nationalists) 5 5 4 
Ecolo (Greens) 6 6 6 
PS (Socialists) 21 21 21 
MR (Liberals) 18 19 20 
FN (extreme right) 2 2 1 
PSC (Chr.-Dem.) 12 12 12 
Total (Seats) 150 150 150 
 
The same simulations applied to the election result of 1995 show the same pattern. With the 
exception of Agalev, the parties of the incumbent governmental coalition going into the 2003 
election are favoured by the proposed changes of the electoral rules. However, the 
government would have only picked up two additional seats.  
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To sum up, the mechanical effects of the new electoral rules for 2003 when applied to 
the number of votes cast in 1995 and 1999 do have a small effect in the direction predicted by 
the theory. The governing parties together, particular the francophone ones, can expect to fare 
better under the new rules than under the old rules. Thus, the proposed change can be at least 
considered a compromise between different goals of large parties (Liberals and Socialists) and 
the small parties (Greens) that are potentially hurt by the 5%-treshold. Looking at the parties 
in government individually does support this argument for Ecolo. However the Flemish Green 
party, Agalev, does in fact loose seats. It seems to be unclear why this party supported 
legislation to reform the electoral law. Even enlarging the districts, what might be seen as a 
compromise, cannot be expected to gain offset the disadvantages of employing a 5%threshold 
at the district-level. The Agalev leadership should have only expected to get hurt by this 
reform. 
How do voters respond to the new electoral rules? The number of Strategic Voters in a 
given district is typically predicted by the district magnitude, i.e. the number of seats that are 
awarded at the primary electoral district level. Cox (1997) following Cox and Shugart (1996) 
claim that in districts with magnitude 5 and larger it becomes to hard for voters to form 
expectations of who will be a contender for a seat and who is out of the running. 
Consequently, strategic voting should fade out because it becomes too difficult to predict 
when a vote will be wasted. Hooghe et al (2003, forthcoming) argue that there is not much 
evidence of strategic voting analyzing district-level results of the 2003 parliamentary election, 
not even in small districts.  
A more direct way to examine the psychological mechanism of electoral reform is to 
look at survey data and check how voters respond to the new rules. Do they waste their votes 
more often as the benchmark through the relationship of the frequency of strategic voting and 
the district magnitude would suggest? In 2003 we (Gschwend and Pappi, forthcoming) fielded 
 7
a pre-election study about 2 weeks before the election in order to get information about the 
context of strategic voting of the 2003 election. In order to maximize leverage on the key 
contextual independent variable for strategic voting – district magnitude – we draw a random 
sample of 100-200 respondents in every of the eleven new electoral districts in Belgium.  
 How do voters form expectation whether a vote for their most preferred party is 
wasted? Since this is the crucial questions voters face when heading to the ballot box, I 
seriously question the ad-hoc log of Cox (1997) and Cox and Shugart (1996) that strategic 
voting should suddenly become to complicated (Gschwend et al 2004, Gschwend 2005). In 
the case of the 2003 election voters (or the media) might employ an electoral history heuristic 
(Gschwend 2004a) and focus on the prior election in their province (the new electoral 
district). Given the 1999 results and the workings of the new electoral law (see table 1) would 
a vote for a particular party be a wasted vote? If no: there is no reason to cast a strategic vote. 
If yes, then those voters who prefer a party that would not have gotten a seat in their district 
under this counterfactual but vote for a party that did fare better as their most preferred party 
are likely to behave strategically. These voters try to avoid wasting their votes. I assume that a 
voter whose most preferred party’s vote share is below the effective threshold of the electoral 
districts (Leiphart1994: 27) does not expect to gain a seat there. Following this definition we 
get an estimate for the number of strategic voters in a given district. Although there is no clear 
relationship between the district magnitude and the frequency of strategic voting, theoretically 
at least, it seems plausible to take the logarithm of the district magnitude (M) to build some 
non-linearity into the model and make the unit-homogeneity assumption more believable. The 
expected difference in the frequency of strategic voting between two electoral districts of 
district magnitude 3 and 4 should be greater than between 19 and 20. I distinguish small from 
large electoral districts. The defining criterion for a small district is that the 5%-treshold 
should not make any difference there. This is true for all districts with district magnitude 
 8
smaller than 10. Thus I have small districts where only the change of the district magnitude 
took place and the large districts where potentially the 5%-thershold might become 
influential. 
 Running a regression on the observed frequencies of strategic voting for all eleven 
electoral districts in Belgium with log(M) interacted with a dummy for small districts 
including the constituent main effects on obtains the following predictions together with their 
95 % confidence intervals.  
Graph 1:  Predicting Strategic Voting across Electoral Districts 
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Strategic Voting and District Magnitude
 
Despite large confidence intervals because of the small samples these numbers are based on, 
there is strong evidence of strategic voting within the small districts. There is less strategic 
voting to be expected in the large districts. In fact, the observed frequencies of strategic 
voting could be observed by chance in our survey. They are not systematically different from 
zero.  
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How can one test whether the 5% district threshold did have an additional motivating 
factor for voters to try to avoid wasting their vote? Without being able to experimentally 
manipulate one can only get indirectly at the casual mechanism. In the following I try to 
predict whether someone casts a strategic vote based solely on the existence of certain 
situational incentives that the context provides. The dependent variable is dichotomous 
scoring one if the respondent casts a strategic vote, i.e. if she does not expect her most 
preferred party to gain a seat in their electoral district but instead vote for a party that did fare 
better than their most preferred party. As independent variables I employ a dummy scoring 1 
if the expected votes shares, operationalized as the actual district-level vote shares of 2003, of 
her most preferred party is below 5% (5% THRESHOLD), below the (upper) threshold of 
exclusion (EXCLUSION) and below the (lower) threshold of representation (REPRESENTATION). 
 
Table 3:  Predicting the Proclivity of an Individual Strategic Vote as a Function of 
Situational Criteria 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Did R. cast a Strategic Vote? 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
5% THRESHOLD 1.098 0.370 0.003 
EXCLUSION 4.985 0.533 0.000 
Constant -5.838 0.448 0.000 
    
5% THRESHOLD 2.012 0.434 0.000 
REPRESENTATION 3.832 0.428 0.000 
Constant -4.803 0.258 0.000 
N 1825  
 
The logit results clearly demonstrated that the anticipation of the 5% threshold at the district-
level does in fact significantly contribute the an individuals’ proclivity to cast a strategic vote 
above and beyond the mechanical constraints of the Belgium electoral systems, the upper and 
lower threshold of exclusion and representation, that have been already present before under 
the two-tier rule (Vander Weyden 2001). Thus, this analysis demonstrates that even the new 
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incentives to cast a strategic vote through the need for every party to overcome 5% of the 
district vote share before gaining representation has already a systematic impact on the 
decision-making process of Belgium voters. 
 To conclude while the voters apparently understand the new system reasonably well to 
respond to the situational criteria that might motivate them to not vote for their most preferred 
party in 2003, the party elites of the Flemish Greens did not anticipate the consequence of the 
proposed electoral reform on the parties expected vote shares – with enormous consequences 
as we know of today. Agalev lost all their seats in the 2003 election and consequently all 
Federal subsidies (Hooghe et al, forthcoming). Nevertheless, the proposed reform does fit 
Benoit’s (2004) theory that parties follow a seat-maximizing strategy when drafting such 
proposal. Probably anticipating the preferences of the small coalition partners (the 
enlargement of the districts did come later on the negotiating table) the new electoral law 
might be interpreted as a compromise between the coalition partners.  
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